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ABSTRACT 
The confirmation bias occurs when an individual ignores potentially disconfirming evidence 
and gives greater attention to apparent confirming evidence.  The confirmation bias is 
theorized to result from rapid, automatic and unconscious processing.  Such processing 
generates decisions that are considered to be “good enough” to meet the demands of a 
situation.  Although such judgments are guided by unconscious processing, the individual 
may have conscious awareness of the generated hypothesis while still failing to systematically 
consider important information.  Previous attempts to counter the confirmation bias have 
focused on directly instructing individuals to use systematic decision making.  This method 
has had some success in laboratory tasks but has shown little transfer to real-world, everyday 
decision making.  Systematic processing requires cognitive resources and more time than 
reliance on automatic processing.  Therefore, individuals may refuse to engage in systematic 
processing unless they have a strong belief that their hypothesis is flawed.  The experiments 
described in this paper attempt to increase participant’s doubt in their flawed hypothesis by 
calling attention to failure and by increasing the apparent difficulty of the task.  Such doubts 
were expected to increase systematic processing.  While focusing attention on failed decisions 
did increase the time participants spent making decisions, such increased deliberation time did 
not translate to improved accuracy.  However, the experiments support the use of the 
Matchmaker Task to create a specific bias that can persist over numerous trials.   
  
 
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Every day, human beings must deal with complex, ambiguous situations requiring them to process a 
staggering amount of information.  People can make decisions nearly instantly without systematic 
deliberation yet with enough accuracy to continue to function in their complex environment.  Unfortunately, 
such decision-making often occurs automatically and thus, individuals may be misled due to the failure to 
consider important information and possible alternatives.  The purpose of this dissertation is to examine what 
can lead individuals to accept flawed judgments without systematic consideration and to test methods of 
increasing deliberation in the hopes of avoiding such errors.  I will begin with a brief discussion of the 
automatic, unconscious processing that can lead to inaccurate judgments.  I will also discuss briefly how 
individuals may develop conscious awareness of their decision criteria while still avoiding systematic 
consideration and how such shallow, heuristic processing may lead to continuing flawed judgments.  In 
particular, I will discuss how the confirmation bias demonstrates the problems caused by automatic 
processing coupled with shallow conscious processing.  Previous attempts to counter the confirmation bias 
have focused on instructing individuals to engage in systematic, conscious processing.  While such methods 
have shown some success in improving participant accuracy in laboratory tasks, such instruction does not 
transfer to situations where the confirmation bias occurs in everyday life (Arkes, 1991; Beyth-Marom & 
Fischoff, 1983; Kahneman, 2011).  The lack of transfer from experimental tasks to later real life decisions 
may be due partly to laboratory tasks typically being deterministic, meaning that the best hypothesis will 
guarantee success.  In the real world, the best possible decision may simply be the one with the highest 
probability of success but there may be no guarantee of constant success.  Additionally, individuals may only 
engage in systematic processing in experimental tasks because they are directly instructed to do so.  The 
participants may view the direct instruction as an indication that their initial hypothesis is flawed.  Without 
such a prompt in everyday situations, individuals are willing to accept the first decision that seems good 
enough (Kahneman, 2011).  The experiments described in this paper are designed to evaluate these two 
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hypotheses through the use of the Matchmaker task.  The task is adapted from work by Downar, Bhatt, and 
Montague (2011) to provide a more probabilistic task that should be easy for participants to understand while 
still complex enough to require systematic consideration to achieve success above that of chance selection.  
In prior research, the confirmation bias has been found to be very persistent even when participants are not 
achieving accuracy much better than chance using their biased hypotheses (Arkes, 1991; Gilovich, 1991; 
Nickerson, 1998).  Additionally, the experiments attempt to see if individuals can be led to more deliberate 
and systematic decision-making without direct prompts to do so and, further, if such deliberation leads to 
increased accuracy.   
1.1 Unconscious, Heuristic, and Systematic Processing 
 A human being behind the wheel of an automobile must quickly process a great deal of information.  
The driver must maintain awareness of the vehicles around himself as well as the road in front of him.  He 
must keep track of his speed and any road signs.  He must maintain proper position of his hands on the 
steering wheel and his feet on the pedals.  He may have to remember directions to his destination or else 
listen to the directions given by a passenger or navigation device.  Finally, he must do all this while 
travelling at speeds far in excess of those he could achieve through his own physiology.  On the surface, such 
a task seems truly daunting but most drivers rarely even consider most of the above information.  The 
instruction “turn left” is translated into “place foot on brake until a certain speed is reached and turn the 
wheel a certain degree to the left” without the driver ever stopping to think.  Even a highly unexpected event 
such as a cat running into the road is likely to be met with an automatic application of the brakes without the 
driver ever pausing to consider the proper response to the event.  Driving is just one example of a human’s 
ability to rapidly and successfully make decisions in complex and often ambiguous situations (Klein, 1998; 
Plessner & Czenna, 2008; Sallas, Mathews, Lane, & Sun, 2007). 
 Automatic processing functions like a motor reflex.  When the individual is exposed to particular 
stimuli, his or her automatic processing is triggered and generates a response (Kahneman, 2011).  A myriad 
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of responses are possible but all are based on prior experience and can occur without the conscious 
awareness of the individual.  While looking at a large menu for a restaurant, the individual may feel drawn to 
order a steak after only glancing over the menu.  The individual may not even consider the plethora of other 
options on the menu or why a steak would be preferable to all other choices.  If the person took the time to 
carefully consider each choice, she might recall prior times when she ate steak and enjoyed the meal.  
Careful consideration of prior positive experiences would likely lead her to choose the steak as well.  Since 
automatic decision-making is based on experience, it is a useful shortcut and a lifetime of automatic 
decision-making conditions people to accept the recommendations of their subconscious mind (Bechara, 
2005; Kahneman, 2011; Klein, 1998).   
 Automatic processing can be effective in helping the individual perform complex tasks and may 
provide an accurate guide for decision-making even if the individual does not consciously understand why 
certain decisions are preferable to others (Druhan & Mathews, 1989; Frank, Rudy, Levy, & O'Reilly, 2005; 
Greene, Spellman, Dusek, Eichenbaum, & Levy, 2001; Mathews, Buss, Stanley, Blanchard-Fields, Cho, & 
Druhan, 1989; Roussel, Mathews, & Druhan, 1990).  For example, in the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara, 
2005), participants must select from four decks of cards with ambiguous odds of either a net win or a net 
loss.  Half the decks have a high one-time payout for selecting from them but higher odds of a loss of money 
with each draw so that over time, these decks will lead to a net loss.  The other two decks give a lower 
payout per draw but have lower odds of losing money and so the participant will have a net gain of money.  
The majority of participants without any neurological impairments (such as schizophrenia or brain damage) 
are able to reliably choose the best deck many trials before they can explicitly state what makes one deck 
better than others (Bechara, 2005).   
 Individuals may use automatic, unconscious processing to their advantage even if they are 
consciously attempting to make decisions based on incomplete information.  For example, in Berry and 
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Broadbent’s task control experiment, participants were tasked with managing sugar output at a sugar plant as 
well as relations with a union representative.  Participants were told of a relationship between the hiring of 
workers and sugar production and of a relationship between behavior toward a union representative and the 
opinion of the union representative toward the factory manager (the participant) (Berry & Broadbent, 1987).  
However, participants were not explicitly aware that hiring workers also affected the union representative’s 
opinion.  Despite having no conscious knowledge of this relationship, most participants made decisions that 
effectively managed the relationship between these variables.  Participant selections indicated awareness of 
the true relationships within the task but many participants could not explicitly identify the relationships until 
much later in the task. 
  When decisions must be made quickly, automatic and unconscious processing is to the individual’s 
advantage.  Even if relevant information has not been consciously encoded or can’t be easily retrieved, the 
individual may be able to make decisions quickly and easily as her automatic processing provides a decision 
that feels right (Gilovich, 1991; Kahneman, 2011; Klein, 1998).  Unfortunately, such automatic processing 
can be inflexible.  Irrelevant information may lead to an automatically generated reaction that is not optimal 
due to some other factor.  For example, a person may show the same driving habits while operating a moving 
van loaded with possessions that he would while driving a small car that he has more experience driving.  He 
might maintain the same distance from the car in front of him that he would normally and thus fail to account 
for the increased stopping distance required by the larger vehicle.  Such behavior, which is likely to occur 
without the driver even thinking about his driving behavior, could potentially be disastrous.  When automatic 
processing generates sub-optimal decisions due to inflexibility, the resulting pattern of poor decision-making 
is termed a bias.  Biases are rapidly generated beliefs that are less than ideal for the current situation.  Biases 
generate hypotheses that are “good enough” for a given situation and have succeeded in the past (Arkes, 
1991; Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009; Nickerson, 1998; Weber & Johnson, 2009).   
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 Although biases arise from automatic and unconscious processing, individuals may be consciously 
aware of their decisions and may even have some knowledge of why a given decision seems correct.  To go 
back to the example above, the driver of the moving van may take a moment to focus on their driving and 
may even think of a rule from driver’s education that dictates how closely he should follow another car.  
Since the justification for his behavior seems accurate, he does not consider further.  This kind of shallow but 
conscious processing takes a bit longer than purely automatic processing but does not take the time to 
consider all alternatives (Kahneman, 2011).  This kind of shallow processing is termed heuristic processing 
(Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  Heuristic processing relies on rules of thumb and 
other shortcuts to make decisions in order to reduce the mental demands of conscious processing 
(Kahneman, 2011).  Unfortunately, heuristic processing is also strongly influenced by automatic, 
unconscious processing.  Thus, heuristic processing is vulnerable to biases.  Unless the individual takes the 
time to systematically consider all relevant information, he or she is vulnerable to bias.  The confirmation 
bias provides an illustration of how an individual may have conscious awareness of the decisions he or she is 
making yet still fail to recognize important information that would appear obvious with systematic 
consideration. 
1.2 The Confirmation Bias      
 The confirmation bias occurs whenever a decision maker fails to consider information that might 
disprove a hypothesis and focuses on information that supports the hypothesis (Lillienfield, Ammirati, & 
Landfield, 2009; Nickerson, 1998; Silverman, 1992).  Information that supports a hypothesis is referred to as 
confirming evidence and evidence that goes against a hypothesis is referred to as disconfirming evidence.  
While logical reasoning systems, such as the scientific method, are based on trying to disconfirm hypotheses, 
people appear to naturally focus more on confirming evidence (Beyth-Marom & Fischoff, 1983; Cohen, 
1981; Feeney, Evans, & Venn, 2008).  Automatic processing is, by its very nature, based on the things that 
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do happen rather than those that do not.  Systematic testing of all possible explanations demands time and 
mental resources and may pose a risk to the individual when speed is essential. 
Individuals tend to accept the first option that seems “good enough as has been shown in the 
literature.  Wason’s triplet task has been repeatedly used to demonstrate that individuals tend to make such 
decisions without engaging in systematic processing (Wason, 1960; Wason, 1962; Wason, 1968).  In the 
triplet task, participants are given a triplet of numbers such as “2 4 6” and asked to generate a new triplet that 
follows the rule used to generate the first triplet.  Participants typically generate a triplet that confirms to a 
more specific rule, such as “ascending multiples of 2” rather than a less specific rule like “ascending 
numbers.”   Participants will usually stick with whichever rule they find is able to create a correct triplet and 
will typically not try other rules to determine if a simpler rule could achieve success and make it easier to 
generate triplets to test (Mynatt, Doherty, & Tweney, 1977; Shaklee & Fischoff, 1982; Wetherick, 1962).  
Participants are consciously aware of the rule they use to create new triplets but tend to use the most specific 
rule that could have generated the example triplet given at the beginning of the task.  
The triplet task thus serves as a good representation of the confirmation bias in action.  Individuals 
accept their biased hypotheses because heuristic processing does not find any obvious flaws.  If an individual 
has become sick after eating fish for the first time, he has little motivation to engage in further testing to 
determine if eating fish always creates sickness.  Unless there are no other food options available, the 
individual will probably not systematically try to find which fish are good and which are not.  However, the 
individual may be prompted to engage in systematic processing if, for example, several trusted friends 
recommend that he try other kinds of fish.  In such a situation, the individual may more carefully consider 
the information available.   
Previous research has focused on countering the confirmation bias by explicitly prompting 
participants to more carefully consider available information (Larrick, 2004).  This method, referred to as the 
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consider the alternative strategy, instructs the participant to think about other possible choices or hypotheses 
and what evidence confirms or disconfirms each one (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart, 1988; Kray & 
Galinsky, 2003; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984).  Without any prompting, participants tend to favor any 
evidence that supports their pre-existing belief.  However, when directly asked to consider what evidence 
supports an alternative hypothesis, participants had reduced confidence in their initial hypotheses and greater 
willingness to choose alternatives.  The consider the alternative strategy and other forms of deliberate, 
systematic processing are too cognitively demanding to be used constantly (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984).  
Therefore, simply telling participants not to let their biases influence them is not reliably effective.  
Individuals tend to remain reliant on their automatically generated and heuristically accepted hypotheses 
unless directly prompted to do otherwise.   
Even if individuals are directly prompted to consider the alternative, they may still give greater 
weight to the initial hypothesis than to their alternatives.  Further, they may have difficulty recognizing what 
information is relevant without structured prompting (Cox & Popken, 2008; Kardes, et al., 2006).  If 
participants find it difficult to think of alternatives or evidence supporting alternatives, then the consider the 
alternative strategy can even backfire and strengthen belief in the original, biased hypothesis (Sanna & 
Schwarz, 2006; Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002).  The consider the alternative strategy does not directly 
address the automatic processing that led the individual to accept a biased hypothesis in the first place.  Thus, 
debiasing should also consider methods to reduce the confidence felt by participants toward an automatically 
generated, biased hypothesis. 
1.3 Confidence and Feeling of Rightness 
Individuals have a lifetime of relying on automatic and heuristic processing to make successful 
decisions.  This leads individuals to have overconfidence in the hypotheses created and confirmed by such 
processes.  Individuals often have confidence in their decision-making abilities for a given task that far 
exceeds their actual accuracy (Gilovich, 1991).  The overconfidence in automatic and heuristic processing is 
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what makes biases so powerful.  When assessing a hypothesis, confidence can be thought of as a “feeling of 
rightness.”  If a hypothesis “feels right”, people will often accept the hypothesis without systematically 
considering other alternatives (Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012; Topolinski & Reber, 2010).  This feeling of 
rightness has been experimentally measured by rating their confidence on a Likert scale ranging from 
“Guessing” to “Certain I’m Right.”  Heuristic decision making is rapid and quick decisions are associated 
with higher ratings of confidence  (Thompson, Turner, & Penncook, 2011).  When confidence is high, 
participants have little reason to engage in more systematic processing.  Thinking of alternatives and 
evidence to support them is a cognitively demanding process and will not feel as easy as automatic and 
heuristic processing.  Since ease of processing is an important component of the feeling of rightness, 
individuals will be predisposed to retain their original hypothesis.  This is supported by Sanna et al.’s work 
which demonstrates that increasing the cognitive demands required to consider alternatives leads to a greater 
tendency to reject all alternatives and retain the original hypothesis. (Sanna, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002).  
Unless participants are given sufficient reason to doubt their initial hypotheses, they will persist.  The 
following experiments attempted to decrease participant confidence and thus lead participants to engage in 
more systematic processing.  This was done using the Matchmaker task, adapted from work by Downar, 
Bhatt, and Montague (2011). 
1.4 The Matchmaker Task 
 The Matchmaker Task is based on a medical task created by Downar et al. to study biased decision 
making in experienced physicians.  In Downar et al.’s original task, the doctors were tasked with treating a 
patient for a heart attack using one of two medicines.  They were presented with several health measures to 
use in determining which drug would be appropriate.  Although only one factor was actually relevant, 
participants invariably believed that at least one other spurious factor was also relevant to making the 
decision.  Although some doctors were able to achieve a high level of success in the task, they did so using 
overly complex hypotheses that focused on some factors that were not relevant to decision-making.  
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Participants did have explicit hypotheses about the relevant factors but did not engage in systematic 
processing.  Instead, participants accepted initial hypotheses with little variation throughout the task.  
 While the medical task was able to demonstrate the confirmation bias, it was designed for 
experienced physicians and thus may appear overly complex and difficult to understand for those without 
medical training.  The Matchmaker task was created to be more accessible to lay persons by instead using the 
framing narrative of a matchmaking service (Finkel et al., 2012).  Participants must consider some basic 
personality factors to determine what kinds of matches are preferred by two different bachelors.  
Additionally, the Matchmaker task adds an additional level of control that is absent from the medical task.  
In Downar et al.’s task (2011), the spurious factors varied greatly among participants.  In the Matchmaker 
task, a priming phase is introduced to guide some participants toward a specific spurious belief.  In doing so, 
the Matchmaker task allows researchers to more systematically examine how a specific biased belief may 
form and then determine if confidence in that belief is reduced and if participants eventually reject the 
apparently relevant but actually spurious factor. 
 Three experiments were performed using the Matchmaker task.  The first was created as a pilot study 
to determine if the priming phase of the Matchmaker task could lead participants to develop a biased 
hypothesis and if that hypothesis would persist even when it failed to achieve optimal success.  The second 
experiment was designed to study if calling attention to failures would lead to a reduction in confidence, 
increase systematic processing, and improve accuracy.  Finally, the third experiment was designed to test if 
increasing the apparent difficulty of the task would reduce confidence and increase systematic processing. 
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CHAPTER 2.  MATCHMAKER TASK PILOT STUDY 
  The Matchmaker task was created to replicate the physician medical task created by Downar et al. 
(2011).  Matchmaker places participants in the role of recommending matches for clients, similar to a dating 
service.  Many online matchmaking services advertise the idea that compatibility factors can be used to make 
matches essentially automatically (Finkel, Eastwick, Karney, Reis, & Sprecher, 2012).  Although 
Matchmaker and the physician task are comparable in the abstract, Matchmaker was designed to seem more 
intuitive to participants without any formal training.  Participants were expected to believe multiple factors 
were relevant to making a match.  A priming phase was included to focus individuals on a particular spurious 
factor.   
2.1 Methods 
Participants were told that their job was to find good matches for two clients of the Matchmaker 
service.  The participants were presented with pictures of the two clients, named Frank and James.  The 
pictures were selected from royalty free images to be distinct from one another but otherwise normal pictures 
of Caucasian, young adult males with brown hair.  Participants were to match James and Frank with potential 
matches based on five compatibility factors: whether the match enjoyed watching sports, the match’s hair 
color (blond or brunette), the match’s favorite artistic hobby (painting, writing, or music), whether the match 
liked to drink alcohol regularly or not, and the match’s age (ranging from 21 to 32 and arranged into 3 age 
range blocks).  Of these, only hair color was relevant to success or failure for a match.  One client preferred 
blondes while the other preferred brunettes.  However, there was a 25% chance of the opposite hair color 
being correct on a given trial.  Therefore, selecting based on the relevant factor was most likely to result in a 
good match but was not guaranteed.  No other compatibility factors were relevant.  The Matchmaker task 
consists of: the priming phase, learning phase, and hypothesis test.    
2.1.1 Priming Phase   
In the priming phase, participants were shown the pictures of each client along with a short 
description of the client.  This description stated that the client was either a strong supporter of LSU athletics 
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and now worked as a coach or stated that the client was in medical school and had been active in theater.  
After viewing the client information for one minute, the participants were then shown descriptions of four 
potential matches that were rated positively by the client in the past.  Each match was presented as a short 
paragraph describing the match and including information relevant to the five compatibility factors.  Each of 
the 8 paragraphs (4 for each client) was unique but used a similar structure.  Each match began with a 
sentence indicating whether the match enjoys watching sports (using sentences such as ‘Susan is a lifelong 
fan of LSU football’) or does not enjoy watching sports (using sentences like ‘Lisa finds sports very boring’) 
followed by further sentences covering the other four factors.  Information about hair color was always 
included in the middle of the paragraph and never in the first or last sentences.  Further, all four positive 
matches either enjoyed watching sports (in the case of the coach) or did not enjoy watching sports (in the 
case of the med student).  Three of the four positive matches conformed to the hair color preferences of the 
client while one of those matches was reversed, preserving the probability of hair color match in the learning 
phase. 
2.1.2 Learning Phase 
 In the learning phase, participants were presented with a short profile of a potential match including 
a one word response to five questions (one for each of the compatibility factors).  The questions were 
identical but there were a few different possible answers for each factor.  There were 72 total matches, 
representing every possible combination of the parameters for the five variables.  Participants were instructed 
to press a key to recommend the match to one of the two clients (F for Frank and J for James).  After making 
4 matches, the participant were shown a feedback screen which stated how many of the last 4 matches were 
successful.  Each block of four trials contained two Bias Congruent trials and two Bias Incongruent trials.  In 
the bias congruent trials, the primed Sports Preference corresponded to the correct Hair Color while in bias 
incongruent trials, Sports Preference and Hair Color were at odds.  Each block had two trials in which the 
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correct answer was Frank and two trials in which the correct answer was James.  The other three 
compatibility factors were randomized.   
2.1.3 Hypothesis Test   
The hypothesis test consisted of a written form on which participants were instructed to rate how 
relevant each of the five factors was to each client on a scale of 0 (not relevant at all) to 4 (extremely 
relevant).  Participants were also asked to select which parameter the client preferred on a given factor if it 
was relevant. Each factor’s parameters also included a ‘Doesn’t Matter’ option if none of the parameters 
were important.  This was included as an additional method for participants to indicate a spurious factor.  
Participants did not receive any feedback during the hypothesis test. 
2.1.4 Participants  
There were 125 participants, recruited from students enrolled in undergraduate Psychology courses.  
Participants received course credit for participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
groups: a control group or a bias prime group.  The bias primed group completed the priming phase, then a 
hypothesis test for each client, then a forced comparison test before completing the learning task and a 
second round of hypothesis tests and a second speed test.  The control group completed only the learning 
task then hypothesis tests for both clients and a forced comparison test.   
2.2 Results   
For the learning phase, a mixed model ANOVA found that the bias prime group was significantly 
less accurate than the control group on bias incongruent trials (F(1, 123)=35.61, p<.001) but significantly 
more accurate on bias congruent trials (F(1, 123) = 19.52, p<.001).  On the hypothesis test following the 
learning phase, there was no significant difference between groups in ability to correctly identify hair color 
preference (F(1, 123)=1.39, p=.24) but the bias prime group was significantly more likely to rate sports 
preference as relevant consistent with the information presented in the bias prime phase (F(1,123)=9.15, 
p<.005).   There was a significant difference in reaction time between groups during the learning phase (F(1, 
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123)=30.48, p<.001) with the bias prime group having a significantly faster reaction time than the control 
group on the bias incongruent trials. 
2.3 Discussion   
The bias prime group had a persistently lower performance on bias incongruent trials than the control 
group.  Bias incongruent trials consisted of any trials where the primed bias that Sports Preference was 
relevant to client preference predicted a choice counter to the choice predicted by the truly relevant factor 
(hair color).  The control group had performance at chance (50% accuracy) throughout the task.  The bias 
prime group was very accurate whenever the biased belief happened to correspond with the true rule of the 
task, namely that Sports Preference happened to correspond with Hair Color.  However, the bias prime group 
had low accuracy whenever Sports Preference did not correspond with Hair Color.  Some participants 
reported Hair Color as a relevant factor on the hypothesis test.  However, no participant endorsed Hair Color 
as the sole relevant factor.  Bias primed participants had poor performance on bias incongruent trials which 
may indicate that the primed bias interfered with any processes that might lead them to recognize that the 
importance of Hair Color.  Participants saw that 75% of the matches preferred by each client were of a 
certain Hair Color but showed a much stronger retention of the four matches for each client all having a 
particular Sports Preference.  Despite the feedback given during the task indicating the participants were 
only accurate about 50% of the time, the bias primed participants persisted in focusing their attention on 
Sports Preference.  The bias priming phase created a bias that ignored a 75% probability of success in favor 
of a 50% probability.  However, there was some shift toward higher accuracy in some of the bias primed 
participants in the later part of the task, indicating that the bias is not impossible to overcome.  This may 
have been due, in part, to bias primed participants acquiring some knowledge about the relevance of Hair 
Color but this knowledge may not have been explicit.  If bias primed participants are acquiring some 
automatic knowledge of Hair Color as a relevant factor, then bias primed  participants should show greater 
accuracy than non-primed participants whenever the primed bias can’t be used. 
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The primed participants had a significantly faster reaction time than control group participants when 
making choices, indicating they were using automatic processing and quick, heuristic processing more than 
the control group.  The bias prime group did demonstrate some explicit knowledge but did not engage in the 
effortful processing necessary to learn the true relevant factor.   In order for participants to disregard the 
initial biased prime, they must have some reason to do so.  Experiments 2 and 3 attempted to reduce 
participant confidence in their biased hypotheses in order to prompt more deliberate, systematic decision-
making.  
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CHAPTER 3.  ATTENTION TO FAILURE 
 People rely on automatic processing because doing so has often brought them success in the past.  
Individuals tend to remember their successes better than their minor failures (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007; 
Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Frank, Rudy, Levy, & O'Reilly, 2005).  Unless automatic processing is evidently 
not optimal for a decision, individual heuristic processing will tend to favor the hypotheses generated 
automatically.  If failures are made more salient, the individual should have reduced confidence in their 
automatic processing and be willing to engage in more systematic processing.  Using sound to draw special 
attention to failures should increase the saliency of failures.  Additionally, improved awareness of decision 
failures may even improve automatic processing as the salient losses provide useful experience for refining 
the automatic, unconscious processing.   
In the Downar et al. study (2011), physicians that devoted greater attention to failures were generally 
more accurate than those who devoted greater attention to success.  Downar et al. used an fMRI and 
determined that some participants showed greater activation in the prefrontal cortex following a failed match, 
indicating they were more responsive to failures, while other participants instead showed greater activation 
in response to successful match.  Participants that were more responsive to failure also tended to be more 
accurate in making decisions. 
3.1 Hypotheses   
Experiment 2 was designed to test whether using visual and sound feedback to make failures more 
salient could alter participant confidence and thus lead to more systematic processing and greater accuracy.  
The hypotheses for the experiment were: 1) Participants experiencing more salient failures will report lower 
confidence in their decisions than those experiencing salient successes, 2) Participants experiencing more 
salient failures will show slower reaction time when making decisions than those experiencing more salient 
successes, 3) Confidence and reaction time will be negatively correlated, indicating that reduced confidence 
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leads to more systematic consideration before making a decision, and 4) Participants experiencing more 
salient failures will have significantly higher accuracy than participants experiencing more salient successes. 
3.2 Methods   
 Several changes were made to the experimental design following analysis of the first experiment.  A 
confidence measure (Likert scale) was added to follow every trial during the Learning Phase.  Second, 
participants in the No Prime conditions were shown eight randomized matches during what served as the 
Priming Phase for the Prime conditions.   
The Learning Phase was divided into two sections: block feedback and trial-by-trial.  Block feedback 
was comparable to the Learning Phase of Experiment 1.  Trial-by-trial feedback provided feedback following 
every trial of the Learning Phase in order to determine if continuous feedback would lead to improved 
accuracy and if continuous feedback would lead primed participants to spontaneously reject their initial 
biased hypothesis.  Block feedback was used initially due to concerns that continuous feedback would make 
it too easy for participants to recognize that their initial hypothesis was flawed.  The results of the pilot test 
indicated that the bias was persistent for most primed participants and therefore, most participants were not 
expected to easily overcome their bias even if feedback was persistent.  The block feedback was retained for 
the first half of the learning phase to allow for some comparison to the pilot study. 
Finally, the variable Sports Preference (used as the priming variable in the Priming Phase) was 
replaced with the variable Entertainment.  Sports Preference only had two possible answers (Yes or No) and 
thus the primed bias could be used for every trial.  Entertainment had three possible answers (Sports, Video 
Games, and Movies) and only two were presented in the Priming Phase.  This change was implemented for 
two reasons.  First it provided trials where the primed participants couldn‘t use their biased hypothesis and 
should demonstrate whether the primed participants believe that Hair Color is relevant after the Priming 
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Phase.  Secondly, changing the variable created more trials for the Learning Phase and provides more time 
for the participants to master the task. 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 187 students (161 female, 26 male) participating for credit in Psychology 
courses at Louisiana State University.  A target n of 40 per group (total n of 160) was selected based on a 
power analysis for a 2x2 ANOVA using a medium effect size (f=.25) for a power of 0.88.  This effect size 
was selected based on the lowest significant effect size found in Experiment 1.  Participants were randomly 
assigned into 4 groups: No Prime/Positive Feedback, No Prime/Negative Feedback, Prime/Positive 
Feedback, and Prime/Negative Feedback. 
3.2.2 Priming Phase   
In the Priming Phase, participants were shown eight paragraphs describing matches.  Participants in 
the Prime conditions were shown a short description and picture of a client and then shown four matches that 
were favored in the past by the client (Appendix B).  They were then shown the same information for the 
second client.  As in Experiment 1, the matches for each client all had the same answer (either Sports or 
Video Games) for one factor (Entertainment).  In the No Prime conditions, participants were shown eight 
matches randomized along the five compatibility factors and were told these were simply random example 
matches.   
3.2.3 Learning Phase  
 In the Learning Phase, participants saw 108 trials presented in a format comparable to Experiment 1.  
After each trial, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their last match on a seven point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (“Guessing”) to 4(“Fairly Certain”) up to 7 (“Certain I’m Right”).  Confidence ratings 
were made before feedback was presented.  For the first 54 trials, participants received feedback after every 
three trials.  For the second 54 trials, feedback was presented following every trial.   
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 Participants in the Negative Feedback condition heard an unpleasant buzzer and saw a red 
background whenever they failed to make a successful match.  During the block feedback part of the 
Learning Phase, this negative feedback was presented after three trials if the participant failed even one 
match out of the three.  During the trial-by-trial feedback section, the negative feedback was given following 
any failed match.  If the participant was successful in all three matches during the block feedback trials or 
made a successful match during the trial-by-trial feedback section, the feedback given on a white screen with 
no sound. 
 For the Positive Feedback condition, participants saw a green background and heard a pleasant ding.  
This occurred if they were successful on even one match of a block during the block feedback section and 
every time they made a successful match during the trial-by-trial feedback.  If they failed all three matches 
during the block feedback or missed a match during trial-by-trial feedback, Positive Feedback participants 
saw a white background with no sound. 
 Reaction time was measured in the learning phase and testing phase from the point of stimulus 
presentation until participants made their selections. 
3.2.4 Testing Phase   
The testing phase was added to the task to test participant accuracy without any further feedback.  
During the Testing Phase, participants completed twelve trials containing four bias incongruent trials (two 
for each client), four bias congruent trials (two for each client) and four bias irrelevant trials (two for each 
client). 
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3.3 Results   
3.3.1 Confidence   
 
Table 3.1 Confidence Ratings (Range: 1-7) 
Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Positive 4.04 1.25 4.11 1.26 4.06 1.22 
No Prime/Negative 4.14 1.33 4.13 1.31 4.13 1.33 
Prime/Positive 5.09 .95 4.96 .92 4.66 1.04 
No Prime/Negative 4.72 1.19 4.52 1.25 4.22 1.20 
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted with prime and feedback as between subjects variables and 
trial type and time as within-subjects variables on participant ratings of confidence.  There was a significant 
effect of trial type (congruent, incongruent, or irrelevant) (F(2,182)=22.88, p<.001) as well as a significant 
interaction between prime and trial type (F(2,182)=24.15, p<.001).  There was no significant interaction 
between feedback and trial type (F(2,182=.89, p=.41) or between trial type, prime, and feedback 
(F(2,182)=.05, p=.96).  There was a significant effect of time (F(6,178)=15.53, p<.001) as well as significant 
interactions between time and Prime (F(6,178)=9.59, p<.001) and between time and feedback 
(F(6,178)=2.46,p<.05).  There was no significant interaction between time, feedback, and prime 
(F(6,178)=.70, p=.65).  There was a significant interaction between trial type and time (F(12,172)=5.78, 
p<.001), between trial type, time, and prime (F(12, 172)=8.67, p<.001) and between trial type, time, prime, 
and feedback (F(12,172)=1.8, p<.05).  Post-hoc analysis revealing that the Prime/Positive Feedback group 
was significantly more confident on all trials (F(3,182)=2.56, p<.05).  There was no significant effect of trial 
type, time, and feedback (F(12,172)=.34, p=.98).  There was no significant effect of the Feedback 
manipulation (F (1,183) = 1.07, p=.30).  There was a significant effect of the bias prime with Prime 
participants demonstrating a higher level of confidence than the No Prime participants (F(1,183)=12.03, 
p<.005).     Post-hoc analysis found that participants in the Prime groups had significantly higher confidence 
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than the No Prime groups in the first 1/3 of the block feedback section of the Learning Phase (F(6,178) = 
15.25, p<.001).   
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3.3.2 Reaction Time 
 
Table 3.2 Reaction Time (in seconds) 
Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Positive 4.39 2.35 3.74 1.88 3.79 2.18 
No Prime/Negative 4.52 1.79 4.08 1.68 4.10 1.83 
Prime/Positive 4.27 1.41 3.96 1.37 4.44 2.39 
No Prime/Negative 4.45 2.04 4.54 2.04 4.36 2.05 
  
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted using reaction time as the DV, feedback and prime as 
between subjects variables, and trial type and time as within subjects variables.  There was a significant 
effect of trial type (F(2,182)=13.61,p<.001), time (F(6,178)=53.71,p<.001) but no significant effect of prime 
(F(1,183)=1.87,p=.17) or feedback (F(1,183)=1.96,p=.16).  There was no significant interaction between 
prime and feedback (F(1,183)=.189, p=.66).  There was a significant interaction between type and prime 
(F(2,182)=22.06,p<.001) but no significant interaction between type and feedback (F(2,182)=1.92, p=.15) or 
between type, prime, and feedback (F(2,182)=.10, p=.91).  There was a significant interaction of time and 
prime (F(6,178)=3.94,p<.005) but no significant interaction between time and feedback 
(F(6,178)=1.22,p=.30), between time, prime, and feedback (F(6,178)=.59,p=.74), between type, time, and 
feedback (F(12,172)=.87,p=.58), or between type, time, prime, and feedback (F(12,172)=.69,p=.76).  There 
was a significant interaction between trial type, time, and prime (F(12,172)=6.04,p<.001).  Post-hoc testing 
revealed that participants in the Prime/Negative Feedback group had significantly longer reaction time 
during the latter half (trial-by-trial feedback) of the Learning phase on bias congruent (F(6, 178)=8.13, 
p<.001) and bias incongruent trials (F(6, 178)=3.67, p<.005) than all other groups.      
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3.3.3 Correlation between Reaction Time and Confidence.  
Table 3.3 Correlation between Reaction Time and Confidence 
Group Pearson’s r Significance 
No Prime/Positive -.07 p<.001 
No Prime/Negative -.12 p<.001 
Prime/Positive -.15 p<.001 
No Prime/Negative -.11 p<.001 
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For all four groups, there was a significant negative correlation between participant confidence and 
reaction time (r=-.13,p<.001).  As participant confidence increased, reaction time decreased.   
3.3.4 Accuracy 
Table 3.4 Accuracy (Percent Correct) 
Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Positive 55.75 17.54 54.99 17.72 55.13 14.10 
No Prime/Negative 59.93 16.95 50.62 18.96 54.98 12.43 
Prime/Positive 83.78 11.57 24.81 14.08 58.75 15.72 
No Prime/Negative 87.09 11.42 23.83 14.29 58.65 13.55 
   
A mixed model ANOVA found no significant effect of the bias prime (F(1,183)=.295, p=.59) or the 
feedback manipulation (F(1,183)=.027, p=.87) on accuracy.  There was a significant effect of trial type 
(F(2,182)=190.80, p<.001) and time (F(6,178)=11.48, p<.001).  There was a significant interaction between 
type and prime (F(2,182)=138.56, p<.001), between time and feedback (F(6,178)=2.85, p<.05),between type 
and time (F(12,172)=7.12, p<.001), between type, time, and prime (F(12,172)=5.03, p<.001) and between 
time, prime, and feedback (F(6,178)=3.15, p<.01).  There was no significant interaction between type and 
feedback (F(2,182)=2.02),p=.14), between type, prime, and feedback (F(2,182)=.23, p=.80), between time 
and prime (F(6,178)=.87, p=.52), between type, time, and feedback (F(12, 172)=1.49, p=.13), or between 
type, prime, time, and feedback (F(12,172)=1.57, p=.11).  Post-hoc analysis found that the Prime groups had 
significantly higher accuracy on bias incongruent trials (F(1,183)=165.67, p<.001) than the No Prime groups 
but significantly lower accuracy on bias incongruent trials (F(1,183)=142.65, p<.001).  Additionally, this 
trend began to reverse over time as the Prime groups showed a reduction accuracy over time on the bias 
congruent trials (F(6,178=5.87, p<.001) and an increase in accuracy over time on the bias incongruent trials 
(F(6,178)=3.38, p<.005).    
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3.3.5 Heuristic and Automatic Judgments   
A regression analysis was conducted to determine what factors significantly predicted the choices 
made by participants.  This measure was based off of Downar at al.’s study (2011) which examined 
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Color as the sole relevant factor on the hypothesis test.  Every participant endorsed at least one spurious rule.  
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted using prime and feedback as between subjects factors and test style 
(significant predictors on regression and endorsed factors on hypothesis test).  Participants endorsed 
significantly more spurious factors than the regression found to significantly predict their choices 
(F(1,134)=69.73, p<.001).  Thus, participants explicitly identified more factors to be relevant than they 
actually used in making their choices.  There was also a significant interaction between test style and prime 
(F(1,134)=5.96,p<.05).  Post-hoc analysis found that the Prime group endorsed significantly fewer spurious 
factors on the hypothesis test (F(1,134)=2.46, p<.05).  There was no significant interaction between test style 
and feedback (F(1,134)=.92) or between test style, prime, and feedback (F(1,134)=.02,p=.89).  Chi square 
analysis found no significant difference between groups in participants that correctly identified color as a 
relevant factor (p=.40) or those who made choices based on color (p=.72). 
Table 3.5: Heuristic and Automatic Judgments  
Group Endorsed  Hair Color 
(Explicit) 
Spurious Factors 
Endorsed (Explicit) 
Hair Color 
(Regression) 
Spurious Factors Used for 
Choice (Regression) 
No Prime/ 
Positive 
74.47% 2.90 55.32 % 1.51 
No Prime/ 
Negative 
69.05% 2.83 42.86% 1.50 
Prime/ 
Positive 
65.71% 2.57 40.00 % 1.83 
Prime/ 
Negative 
50.00% 2.32 42.86% 1.57 
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3.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1 as the participants receiving the bias prime 
showed significantly lower accuracy on Bias Incongruent trials than participants who did not receive the 
prime.  Participants in the Prime groups did have much  higher accuracy on Bias Congruent trials, as 
expected, but combined with their low performance on the Bias Incongruent trials and chance performance 
on Bias Irrelevant trials, the bias prime provided no advantage in total accuracy.  Participants in all 
conditions showed a significant improvement over time, particularly once feedback shifted from occurring 
every 3 trials to a continuous trial-by-trial feedback.  However, the discrepancy between Bias Congruent and 
Bias Incongruent Trials among Prime participants remained throughout the Learning Phase and Testing 
Phase.   
 The use of feedback did not have a significant effect on participant accuracy.  Participants in the 
Negative Feedback groups did not have any difference in accuracy compared to participants in the Positive 
Feedback groups.  However, Negative Feedback did reduce confidence and slow decision-making, 
particularly in the Prime/Negative group.  This indicates that when participants are made more aware of their 
decision-making failures, they do lose confidence in their own ability and spend more time making 
decisions.  Unfortunately, this did not translate to increased accuracy.  Indeed, participants appear to be 
taking longer but not engaging in truly systematic processing at all.  Participants in the Negative Feedback 
groups do not show any differences in their pattern of selection than the participants in the Positive Feedback 
group as the Prime/Negative group still chooses primarily based on the primed bias.  Participants may default 
to their heuristic decision-making as the negative feedback also reduces their confidence in their systematic 
decision-making.  If participants are not confident in their decision-making ability due to their failures being 
made salient, they may choose to use faster, less effortful heuristic processing rather than devote the mental 
resources to systematic processing.  If neither approach seems to be successful, participants have no 
incentive to be systematic and may simply be taking longer to make decisions to avoid hearing the buzzer as 
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often.  Therefore, Experiment 3 is designed to reduce participant confidence due to the apparent difficulty of 
the task rather than an increased saliency for failure.  In doing so, I hypothesized that participants might be 
more willing to engage in systematic processing to meet the demands of the task but without feeling that they 
were poor decision-makers.  Additionally, changing all feedback to trial-by-trial should be more conducive 
to systematic processing as participants are no longer required to remember information for multiple trials 
and guess which trials were successful.    
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CHAPTER 4.  REDUCING SUBJECTIVE FLUENCY 
While confidence may be reduced directly by making failures more salient, confidence, and the 
related feeling of rightness generated by rapid, automatic processing, may also be influenced by the 
subjective difficult of the task.  For example, a common logic problem is “If 5 machines generate 5 units in 5 
minutes, how long would it take 100 machines to generate 100 units?”  Many individuals respond with the 
answer “100 minutes” and report confidence in such an answer even though it is logically incorrect 
(Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012).  Such a result indicates that the individual may accept an automatically 
generated hypothesis on the basis of more than just the information content of the hypothesis.  Instead, any 
generated hypothesis contains both the information content and the sensation of fluency (Pronin & Wegner, 
2006; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004; Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012).  In the context of judgment and 
decision making, fluency refers to how quickly an individual can bring something to mind.  High fluency, 
manifested as a rapidly generated response, is associated with positive affect.  As demonstrated by Pronin 
and Wegner (2006), simply ‘thinking fast’ was able to produce a positive emotional state.  When participants 
read a series of statements designed to elicit either happiness or sadness, they not only reported positive 
feelings in response to the happy statements but also reported positive feelings whenever a statement was 
read quickly.  Fluency was manipulated by varying how quickly the statement was displayed to either faster, 
equal, or slower than typical human reading speed.  When participants saw the statements displayed quickly, 
they had an increase in positive affect.  This experience of positive emotion was distinct from the content of 
the items. 
  Any automatic, rapidly generated response will have an associated level of fluency.  This fluency 
will in turn affect confidence and the individual will accept the automatically generated hypothesis.  Fluency 
may be directly manipulated by making it more difficult for participants to process information.  Even if the 
difficulty is due to an extraneous factor rather than the task itself, participants are more likely to rate the task 
itself as difficult and therefore engage in more effortful processing (Song & Schwarz, 2008).  Song and 
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Schwarz (2008) found that when task instructions were presented in the Mistral font (EXAMPLE) or Brush font 
(EXAMPLE), participants believed the task to be more difficult than participants reading the same 
instructions in Arial font (EXAMPLE).  In Experiment 3, font was manipulated in order to manipulate the 
Feeling of Rightness.  A more difficult font was predicted to reduce fluency and thus confidence.  However, 
if participants are able to recognize the external cause of their reduced fluency, research has shown that the 
reduction in fluency has a reduced impact on confidence.  Thus, the current study will directly ask 
participants about any elements of the task made it more difficult so that participants with explicit awareness 
of the font manipulation can be identified.   
4.1 Hypotheses   
Experiment 3 was designed to test whether a more difficult font would reduce fluency, reduce 
confidence, and improve. The hypotheses for the experiment were: 1) Participants dealing with the more 
difficult font will have lower confidence in their decisions than those reading in the easy font, 2) Participants 
in the difficult font condition will have slower reaction time beyond the effect of slower reading, 3) 
Confidence and reaction time will be negatively correlated, 4) Participants  in the more difficult font 
condition will be more accurate if they engage in more systematic processing, and 5) If participants are 
explicitly aware of the font being difficult they may show no difference from the easy font condition. 
4.2 Methods  
The design remained consistent with the changes made in Experiment 2 with one change.  All 
Learning Phase trials were converted to trial-by-trial feedback.  The trial-by-trial feedback in Experiment 2 
did not result in many participants reaching ceiling accuracy and therefore, it was hypothesized that trial-by-
trial feedback would increase the potential effects of manipulations.  In Experiment 2, trial-by-trial feedback 
was found to improve accuracy but not to the point of a ceiling effect for most participants.   
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4.2.1 Participants 
Participants consisted of 199 students (148 female, 51 male) participating for credit in LSU 
Psychology courses.  The target n was set at 40 per group (160 total) as in Experiment 2 but exceeded target 
n due to unexpectedly high number of sign ups.  Participants were randomly assigned into four groups: No 
Prime/Easy Font, No Prime/Difficult Font, Prime/Easy Font, and Prime/Difficult Font. 
4.2.2 Priming Phase  
The Priming Phase was identical to that used in Experiment 2.  All text was presented in the Brush 
font for participants in the Difficult Font conditions.  The text of the sample matches presented was the same 
as those in the Experiment 2.  After the Priming Phase, participants were asked how difficult they expected 
the task to be.  This measure was included to provide a baseline of subjective difficulty for the task. 
4.2.3 Learning Phase   
The Learning Phase consisted of 108 trials.  Feedback was provided for each trial after participants 
completed the confidence measure.  The participants in the Easy Font conditions saw all text presented in the 
Arial font (the default font used in all previous version of Matchmaker).  Participants in the Difficult Font 
groups saw all text in the Brush font.  Participants were now instructed to “Press SPACEBAR when you are 
ready to make a decision” and were then prompted to select Frank or James.  This was included as a measure 
to ensure that two measures of reaction time were available in case the change in font created differences in 
reading speed.   
4.2.4 Testing Phase   
The testing phase was identical to Experiment 2.  All matches were presented in the Arial font.  After 
the testing phase, participants were asked how difficult they felt the task was and then asked if any element 
of the task had made it more difficult.  This question was included to determine if participants had any 
awareness of the font manipulation.       
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Confidence  
Table 4.1 Confidence (Range: 1-7) 
Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Easy 3.61 1.28 3.60 1.26 3.57 1.29 
No Prime/Difficult 3.53 1.22 3.51 1.19 3.51 1.19 
Prime/Easy 4.19 1.24 3.99 1.16 3.89 1.16 
Prime/Difficult 4.34 1.05 4.15 1.00 4.06 1.00 
A mixed model ANOVA was conducted using the prime and font manipulations as between subjects 
variables and time and trial type as within subjects variables.  There was a significant effect of time 
(F(2,192)=19.37, p<.001), time (F(6,188)=48.66, p<.001), and prime (F(1,193)=11.06, p<.001).  was no 
significant effect of the font manipulation (F (1,193) = 0.068, p=.80).  There was a significant interaction 
between type and prime (F(2,192)=12.90, p<.001), between time and prime (F(6,188)=4.23, p<.001), 
between type and time (F(12,182)=2.99, p<.001), and between type, time, and prime (F(12, 182)=3.35, 
p<.001).    There was no significant interaction between prime and font (F(1,193)=.48, p=.49), type and font 
(F(2,192)=.11, p=.90, between type, prime, and font (F(2,192)=.04, p=.97), between time and font 
(F(6,188)=1.24, p=.29), between time, prime, and font (F(6, 188)=1.45, p=.20), type, time, and manipulation 
(F(12, 182)=.99, p=.46), or between type, time, prime, and font (F(12, 182)=.94, .51).  Prime participants had 
significantly higher confidence than those in the No Prime condition.    
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4.3.2 Reaction Time  
Table 4.2 Reaction Time (in seconds) 
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Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Easy 3.58 1.70 3.70 1.82 3.63 1.74 
No Prime/Difficult 3.77 1.48 3.74 1.57 3.77 1.45 
Prime/Easy 3.87 1.91 4.16 2.02 4.25 2.08 
Prime/Difficult 4.05 1.34 4.36 1.81 4.46 1.61 
 
A mixed model ANOVA using prime and font as between subjects variables and time and trial type 
as within subjects variables.  The analysis found no significant effects of Prime (F(1,193)=2.64, p=.11) or 
Font (F(1,193)=.25, p=.62) nor an interaction between the two (F(1,193)=.53, p=.47).  There was no 
significant effect of type (F(2,192)=.62, p=.54), nor significant interactions between type and prime (F(2, 
192)=1.95, p=.15), between type and font (F(2,192)=.01, p=.99), or between type, prime, and font (F(2, 
192)=.44, p=.64).  There was a significant effect of time (F(6, 188)=25.13, p<.001) and a significant 
interaction between time and prime (F(6, 188)=3.17, p<.01).  There were no significant interactions between 
time and font (F(6,188)=1.35, p=.24), between time, prime, and font (F(6, 188)=.40, p=.88), between type 
and time (F(12, 182)=.92, p=.53), between type, time, and prime (F(12, 182)=.60, p=.84, between type, time, 
and font (F(12, 182)=.43, p=.95, and between type, time, prime, and font (F(12, 182)=1.21, p=.28).   The 
more difficult to read font did not affect the speed with which participants made decisions.   
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4.3.3 Correlation between Reaction Time and Confidence 
Table 4.3 Correlation between Reaction Time and Confidence 
Group Pearson’s r Significance 
No Prime/Easy -.11 p<.001 
No Prime/Difficult -.11 p<.001 
Prime/Easy -.11 p<.001 
Prime/Difficult -.07 p<.001 
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 For all four groups, there was a significant negative correlation between participant confidence and 
reaction time (r=-.10, p<.001).  All four groups also had individually significant negative correlations 
between reaction time and confidence.  Increased confidence led to a decrease in reaction time.   
4.3.4 Accuracy 
Table 4.4 Accuracy (Percent Correct) 
Group Congruent Trials Incongruent Trials Irrelevant Trials 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
No Prime/Easy 66.39 17.09 65.55 17.36 66.32 16.08 
No Prime/Difficult 66.48 17.26 64.49 17.82 64.81 14.05 
Prime/Easy 76.34 15.06 49.32 15.42 65.17 13.73 
Prime/Difficult 81.24 14.36 41.79 21.32 62.12 16.42 
   
A mixed model ANOVA found no significant effect of the bias Prime (F(1,193)=2.58, p=.12) or the 
font manipulation (F(1,183)=.508, p=.48) on accuracy.  There was a significant effect of type (F(2, 
192)=66.36, p<.001), time (F(6, 188)=14.59, p<.001), and significant interactions between type and prime 
(F(2,192)=56.28, p<.001) and between type and manipulation F(2,192)=3.13,p<.05).  The Prime groups did 
have significantly higher accuracy on bias incongruent trials (F(1,193)=27.76, p<.001) than the No Prime 
groups but primed participants also had significantly lower accuracy on bias incongruent trials 
(F(1,183)=27.76, p<.001) than unprimed participants.  There was no significant interaction between time and 
prime (F(6, 188)=1.16, p=.33), between time and font, F(6,188)=.61, p=.73), between and time, prime, and 
font (F(6, 188)=1.87, p=.09), between type, time, and font (F(12, 182)=1.15, p=.32, or between type, time, 
prime, and font (F(12, 182)=.90, p=.55).  There were significant interactions between type and time (F(12, 
182)=5.18, p<.001) and between type, time, and prime (F(12, 182)=4.80, p<.001). 
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   4.3.5 Heuristic and Automatic Judgments   
The analyses used for Experiment 2 were repeated for Experiment 3.  Participants endorsed 
significantly more factors on the hypothesis test than were found to significantly predict their choices on a 
regression analysis (F(1,164)=124.36, p<.001).   Participants in the Prime group were also found to endorse 
significantly fewer factors on the hypothesis test (F(1, 164)=5.07, p<.05) but there was no significant 
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interaction between F(1,164)=1.05, p=.31), between test type and font (F(1,164)=1.14, p=.29), or between 
test type, prime, and font (F(1,164)=1.26, p=.26).  There was a significant effect of font (F(1, 164)=5.73, 
p<.05) with participants in the difficult font group endorsing more factors than the easy font group.  Chi 
square analysis found no significant difference between groups in explicit endorsement of hair color 
(p=.086).  There was a significant difference between groups in the number of individuals making choices 
based on hair color as shown in regression analysis (p<.001) with participants in the Prime/Difficult group 
being less likely to make choices based on hair color.   
Table 4.5 Heuristic and Automatic Judgments  
Group Hair Color 
(Explicit) 
Spurious Factors 
(Explicit) 
Hair Color 
(Regression) 
Spurious Factors for Choice 
(Regression) 
No Prime/ Easy 68.18 % 1.98 65.91% .70 
No Prime/ Diff. 69.57% 2.41 69.57% 1.13 
Prime/ Easy 71.43 % 2.26 70.00% 1.20 
Prime/ Difficult 67.44% 2.22 61.17% 1.58 
 
4.3.6. Explicit Awareness of Font Manipulation 
In order to determine if awareness of the font manipulation affected performance on the task, 
participants that were shown the Difficult Font were divided into those able to explicitly identify the font as a 
contributing factor to task difficulty and those who did not.  Only 19 participants (out of 98) in the Difficult 
Font condition were able to explicitly identify that the font was difficult.  A mixed model ANOVA was 
conducted to determine if knowledge of the font had any effect on accuracy, reaction time, or confidence.  
The analysis found that recognition of the font difficulty had no effect on accuracy (F(1,96)=.12, p=.73), 
reaction time (F(1,96)=.02, p=.89, or confidence (F(1,96)=.26, p=.62).  The results indicate that awareness of 
the font had no effect on participant performance.  Further, awareness of the font manipulation had no effect 
on subjective ratings of difficulty for the task (F(1,96)=.06, p=.81).   
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4.4 Discussion    
The Prime manipulation had effects comparable to Experiments 1 and 2, with the Prime groups 
displaying high accuracy on Bias Congruent trials but lower accuracy on Bias Incongruent trials.  The Font 
manipulation did not show any significant effects on accuracy or confidence.  This may be in part due to 
differences between the Matchmaker task and previous experiments utilizing the font manipulation.  In other 
experiments utilizing a font manipulation, participants were tasked with judging the grammatical accuracy of 
statements or the difficulty of performing a task based on the instructions (Song & Schwarz, 2008; 
Thompson & Morsanyi, 2012; Toplinski & Strack, 2010; Topolinski & Reber, 2010; Topolinski & Strack, 
2009; Topolinski, 2011).  Such tasks require effortful reading with more variation in presentation than 
Matchmaker.  In Matchmaker, participants are shown the same five questions in each match and each 
question only has a few possible answers.  Thus, participants may learn to ignore a great deal of the text to 
only focus on relevant information and may adapt to the font.  The decrease in reaction time over time in the 
experiment across groups may support the idea that participants were adapting to the font.  Alternatively, the 
greater complexity of Matchmaker compared to previous research may also reduce the impact of the font.  
Since Matchmaker already appears to be very complex, the addition of a more difficult to read font may not 
add a great deal of subjective difficulty.  Indeed, many participants in the Easy Font condition reported that 
the task was very complex and difficult.  Thus, the font manipulation may have been ineffective for two 
reasons: first, the Matchmaker task was not as dependent on careful and deliberate reading as the tasks used 
in previous research and second, the Matchmaker task had such subjective complexity that the difficult font 
did not significantly increase it. 
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CHAPTER 5.  GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The three experiments described in this paper were designed to answer two main questions.  The first 
question was whether participants could be primed to develop a persistent bias even when the bias resulted in 
sub-optimal decision-making.  The second question was whether participants could be led to engage in more 
systematic decision-making without being directly told to do so.   
The first question can be answered affirmatively.  Participants receiving a bias prime showed a very 
clear pattern of selecting matches based on the primed bias.   The primed participants persisted in selecting 
based on their bias even when they were receiving continual feedback indicating their accuracy was around 
or below 50%.  Further, the primed bias was based on comparably little information (4 initial matches) while 
participants completed dozens more matches in which the bias was clearly not as accurate as the initial 
matches would have predicted.  Individuals appear to accept an initial hypothesis generated by automatic and 
heuristic processing and will stick with it unless given significant reason to discard it.  This supports one of 
the key arguments of this paper: that heuristic processing has a strong influence on decision-making.  
Individuals will often persist in flawed decision-making due to shallow processing.   
Many participants reported high confidence during the task and indicated they were confident in their 
answers on the explicit hypothesis tests.  Indeed, participants often constructed elaborate theories of exactly 
what each client wanted in a match that could not possibly have held up to systematic scrutiny.  The 
Matchmaker Task favors hypothesis testing using less specific rules as the randomized presentation of 
matches makes it difficult to regularly test more complex rules.  In essence, participants were handicapping 
themselves by sticking with more specific rules when a simpler rule would actually be more effective. 
Even without a prime, participants generated theories about client preferences that were more 
complex than the client’s true preferences.  It is possible that participants were naturally inclined to think that 
the clients had complex tastes in matches rather than unreliable tastes.  In a certain light, this might be seen 
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as a logical approach as a person’s preferences are presumed to be reliable.  People like what they like.  In 
reality of course, general preferences are rarely completely reliable.  A man may fall in love with one blond 
woman while finding another unattractive.  A minority of participants did appear to recognize that the 
clients’ preferences were not 100% guaranteed to result in a successful match but nonetheless were able to 
achieve perfect accuracy during the testing phase.  While this unconscious knowledge did not translate into 
explicit responses on the hypothesis test, these participants did demonstrate true understanding of the clients’ 
preferences when making their selections.  This indicates that some other influence shaped their heuristic 
decision-making when completing the hypothesis test as they should have demonstrated greater accuracy if 
automatic processing was the only influence on their decision.  The participants may have entered the task 
with the pre-existing belief that multiple factors must be relevant and when forced to explicitly state the 
relevant factors, the pre-existing belief overrode any subconscious information indicating that only Hair 
Color was relevant. 
While Experiment 2 did demonstrate that making failures more salient leads to decreased confidence 
and slower reaction time, participants in the Negative Feedback groups were not any better at making 
accurate decisions.  Participants may have engaged in pseudo-systematic processing, in which they took the 
time to think more carefully about their decisions but still accepted the heuristically generated and biased 
hypothesis rather than carefully testing all alternatives.  Even in the trial-by-trial feedback section of the 
Learning Phase, participants in the Prime/Negative Feedback group most often made selections based on the 
primed spurious factor (Entertainment Preference).   
It is possible that the success-focus or failure-focus found in the Downar et al (2011) experiment is 
primarily, or even entirely, an internal trait and is not significantly influenced by the situation.  Participants 
who are failure-focused will pay more attention to failed decisions and thus be more likely to adjust their 
hypotheses and avoid the confirmation bias.  Participants who are success-focused will ignore disconfirming 
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information and be more vulnerable to the confirmation bias.  In order to determine if an individual is more 
failure-focused or more success-focused, psychophysiological measurement or even neuroimaging may be 
necessary to determine if participants have a stronger level of arousal to failures or to success.  Simply 
drawing attention to failure may reduce participant confidence but may not increase their motivation to 
engage in more systematic processing and if the individual is success-focused, they may still overweight 
successes even if failures are more salient. 
While the manipulations of Experiments 2 and 3 were not effective in reducing the confirmation bias 
among primed participants or improving the performance of unprimed participants, the experiments did shed 
further light on the confirmation bias itself.  The Matchmaker Task was shown to be effective in priming a 
specific bias that persisted throughout the task, thus demonstrating that biases can be generated by very 
limited information and that this information can be processed consciously to influence future decision-
making.  Even if individuals experience new information that should counter their initial hypothesis, they 
will persist in their consciously processed but flawed beliefs.  It is possible that the repetitive nature of the 
task actually aided some participants in improving their performance as they stopped devoting mental effort 
to the task and relied more on automatic decision-making.  The differences found between the explicit 
hypothesis test and the regression analysis of actual choices indicate that participants were, on the whole, 
more knowledgeable of client preferences at the subconscious level than in their conscious awareness.  One 
possible future direction for this research is in increasing the length of the task to see if A) participants ever 
reach a point in which their automatic processing finally convinces them to reject their heuristically 
generated hypothesis or B) participants reach a ceiling level of accuracy without ever demonstrating 
complete conscious awareness of the clients’ true preferences.  Another possible direction for future research 
is by reframing the way in which participants work through the task.  If participants are directed to switch 
their focus to trying to make bad matches, they may become better aware of the task conditions.  While this 
is similar to the “Consider the Alternative” approach, it is not dependent on participants being able to think 
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of justification for why an alternative might be reasonable or even what possible alternatives are.  They 
simply have to try matches going against their established hypothesis.  In doing so, the participant may better 
explore the preferences of the clients.   
In conclusion, the Matchmaker Task serves the purpose of being a seemingly complex, probabilistic 
task that remains a viable challenge for participants even after numerous trials.  Participants are presented 
with a diverse problem space to explore and the framing narrative is simple enough that participants should 
not feel that they lack some crucial training important for the task, as compared to medical tasks like Downar 
et al (2011).  The bias generated by Matchmaker appears to be more persistent than the biases shown in more 
deterministic task like the triplet task.  Thus, the Matchmaker Task is a worthwhile “bias simulator” that 
enables researchers to generate a specific bias among participants and test methods to counter that bias.  
Ultimately, the task may prove useful in developing techniques that transfer well to countering biases in the 
real world. 
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APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUAL SPURIOUS FACTORS 
 
Table A.1  Experiment 2:Spurious Factors (individual) 
Subject 
Endorsed Color as 
Relevant Factor 
(Explicit) 
Number of 
Spurious Factors 
Endorsed 
(Explicit) 
Chose Based on 
Color (Regression) 
Number of 
Spurious Factors 
Used for Choice 
(Regression) 
101 Yes 0.5 Yes 2 
102 Yes 4 Yes 2 
103 Yes 2.5 No 2 
104 Yes 3 No 0 
105 Yes 3 No 1 
106 Yes 1.5 Yes 4 
107 Yes 2.5 No 1 
108 Yes 3 Yes 1 
109 Yes 4 No 1 
110 No 3 No 1 
111 Yes 2 Yes 2 
112 Yes 2.5 No 1 
113 No 1.5 No 1 
114 Yes 4 Yes 1 
115 No 3 Yes 2 
117 Yes 4 No 1 
151 Yes 4 Yes 2 
152 No 3.5 Yes 2 
155 Yes 0.5 Yes 1 
156 No 2 Yes 2 
157 Yes 4 No 4 
158 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
159 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
160 Yes 3 Yes 3 
161 No 4 No 1 
162 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
163 Yes 3 No 2 
164 Yes 2.5 No 0 
165 No 3.5 Yes 3 
166 No 3 No 1 
167 Yes 1.5 Yes 2 
168 No 3.5 No 2 
169 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
170 No 4 No 1 
171 Yes 3 Yes 0 
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(Table A.1 cotd) 
172 No 3.5 No 1 
173 Yes 4 No 2 
174 Yes 4 Yes 3 
175 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
176 Yes 4 Yes 1 
178 Yes 1.5 No 1 
179 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
180 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
181 Yes 1.5 No 2 
182 Yes 2 Yes 0 
183 Yes 3.5 Yes 3 
184 No 4 No 1 
201 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
202 Yes 2.5 No 1 
203 No 4 Yes 2 
204 No 2.5 Yes 0 
205 No 1 No 1 
206 Yes 2 Yes 2 
207 No 2.5 No 2 
208 No 2 No 2 
209 Yes 3 No 1 
210 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
211 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
212 Yes 2 No 0 
251 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
252 Yes 4 No 3 
253 No 3 No 0 
254 Yes 3 Yes 1 
255 No 3.5 No 2 
256 No 2 No 3 
257 No 3 Yes 0 
259 Yes 2 No 2 
260 No 3 No 3 
261 Yes 3 Yes 3 
263 Yes 3 Yes 3 
264 Yes 3.5 No 0 
265 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
266 Yes 3 No 1 
267 Yes 4 Yes 3 
268 No 2 No 1 
269 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
270 No 3 No 1 
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271 Yes 3.5 No 2 
272 Yes 3.5 No 1 
273 Yes 2 No 2 
274 Yes 1 Yes 3 
275 Yes 2.5 No 0 
276 Yes 3.5 Yes 0 
277 Yes 3 No 2 
279 Yes 1 No 2 
280 No 4 No 0 
281 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
282 Yes 3 Yes 2 
283 Yes 3 No 0 
301 Yes 2.5 No 1 
302 No 2 Yes 2 
303 Yes 3 Yes 2 
304 Yes 0.5 No 2 
305 Yes 4 No 2 
306 No 2.5 No 2 
307 Yes 4 No 1 
308 Yes 4 Yes 3 
309 Yes 2 No 2 
310 Yes 3 No 2 
311 No 2.5 Yes 0 
312 No 2 No 3 
313 Yes 3 Yes 1 
314 Yes 3.5 Yes 4 
315 Yes 0 Yes 2 
316 Yes 2 Yes 1 
317 No 2 No 2 
318 No 1.5 No 1 
351 Yes 2.5 Yes 3 
352 No 2.5 Yes 2 
353 Yes 4 No 1 
354 Yes 3 No 2 
355 No 4 Yes 1 
356 Yes 1 No 0 
357 Yes 2 No 3 
358 No 3.5 No 2 
359 Yes 2 Yes 2 
360 Yes 3 No 2 
361 Yes 2.5 No 1 
362 No 2.5 No 1 
(Table A.1 cotd) 
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363 No 1.5 No 2 
364 No 3 No 2 
366 Yes 3 Yes 4 
367 Yes 3 No 2 
368 Yes 3 Yes 1 
475 Yes 3 No 0 
476 Yes 2 Yes 3 
477 Yes 1.5 Yes 2 
478 No 0.5 No 2 
480 Yes 2.5 Yes 3 
481 Yes 4 Yes 1 
482 Yes 2 Yes 1 
483 No 1 No 1 
485 Yes 4 Yes 2 
486 No 2.5 No 2 
487 No 3 No 1 
489 No 3 No 0 
490 No 2 No 3 
491 No 1.5 No 1 
 
  
(Table A.1 cotd) 
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Table A.2  Experiment 3: Spurious Factors (Individual) 
Subject 
Endorsed Color 
as Relevant 
Factor (Explicit) 
Number of Spurious 
Factors  Endorsed 
(Explicit) 
Chose Based on 
Color (Regression) 
Total Spurious 
Rules used for 
Choice 
(Regression) 
501 Yes 2 Yes 0 
502 No 1 No 0 
503 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
504 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
505 Yes 0.5 Yes 0 
506 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
507 Yes 2 Yes 1 
508 Yes 2 Yes 1 
510 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
511 Yes 2 Yes 1 
512 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
513 No 3 No 2 
514 No 2 Yes 1 
515 No 1 No 0 
516 Yes 0 Yes 0 
517 Yes 0.5 Yes 1 
518 Yes 3 No 1 
519 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
520 No 4 No 0 
521 No 3.5 No 1 
522 Yes 2 No 1 
523 Yes 3 Yes 0 
524 No 0.5 Yes 0 
525 No 1 Yes 2 
526 No 1 Yes 0 
529 No 0.5 Yes 0 
530 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
531 Yes 2.5 No 0 
532 Yes 3 Yes 1 
554 Yes 1 Yes 1 
555 No 3 No 1 
556 Yes 3.5 No 2 
557 No 1.5 No 0 
558 Yes 1.5 Yes 1 
559 No 1.5 No 0 
560 Yes 0 Yes 0 
561 Yes 0.5 No 0 
562 Yes 3 Yes 0 
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564 Yes 3.5 Yes 0 
565 Yes 2 Yes 2 
566 Yes 2.5 No 1 
567 Yes 3 Yes 1 
568 Yes 2 Yes 1 
569 No 2 No 2 
601 Yes 1 Yes 0 
602 Yes 3 Yes 2 
603 Yes 4 Yes 2 
604 Yes 0.5 Yes 0 
605 No 3 Yes 2 
606 Yes 0 Yes 0 
607 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
608 Yes 1 No 3 
609 No 1 Yes 3 
610 Yes 2.5 Yes 3 
611 No 2 No 1 
612 Yes 3 Yes 2 
613 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
614 Yes 3 Yes 0 
615 No 2.5 No 0 
616 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
617 No 3 No 1 
618 No 3 No 1 
619 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
620 Yes 4 No 2 
621 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
623 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
624 No 4 No 0 
627 No 3.5 No 2 
628 No 1.5 No 1 
629 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
630 No 3 No 2 
631 Yes 2 Yes 1 
655 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
656 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
657 No 0.5 No 2 
658 No 3 No 0 
659 Yes 0.5 Yes 0 
662 Yes 2 Yes 0 
663 No 3 Yes 1 
664 No 3 No 2 
(Table A.2 cotd) 
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665 Yes 3.5 No 0 
666 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
667 Yes 3.5 Yes 0 
669 Yes 2.5 Yes 3 
670 Yes 2 Yes 0 
671 Yes 2 Yes 3 
672 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
673 Yes 3 Yes 1 
674 Yes 2 Yes 2 
675 Yes 1.5 Yes 1 
701 Yes 1.5 Yes 1 
702 Yes 1.5 Yes 2 
703 Yes 0.5 Yes 0 
704 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
705 No 1 No 1 
706 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
707 No 1.5 Yes 1 
708 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
709 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
710 No 3.5 Yes 4 
711 Yes 1 Yes 1 
712 
    713 Yes 1.5 Yes 0 
714 Yes 3.5 Yes 2 
715 No 1.5 No 2 
716 Yes 4 Yes 0 
728 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
729 Yes 2 Yes 1 
730 No 2.5 No 1 
731 No 3.5 No 0 
732 Yes 3 Yes 3 
733 Yes 1 Yes 1 
734 No 0.5 Yes 0 
754 Yes 1 Yes 1 
755 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
756 No 0 No 0 
757 No 1 Yes 0 
759 Yes 3.5 No 3 
760 Yes 4 Yes 0 
761 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
762 Yes 2 Yes 1 
763 Yes 1.5 Yes 1 
(Table A.2 cotd) 
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764 Yes 3 Yes 1 
766 No 3 No 3 
767 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
768 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
801 No 1.5 No 1 
802 Yes 2.5 Yes 1 
803 Yes 3.5 No 1 
804 Yes 4 No 3 
805 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
806 No 2 Yes 2 
807 Yes 2.5 Yes 3 
808 Yes 3 Yes 0 
809 No 3 No 2 
810 Yes 0 Yes 0 
811 No 1.5 No 1 
812 Yes 2 No 2 
813 Yes 3.5 Yes 3 
814 No 4 Yes 3 
815 Yes 0.5 Yes 2 
816 Yes 1 Yes 3 
817 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
818 Yes 0 Yes 1 
819 No 3 No 1 
821 Yes 2.5 Yes 0 
822 Yes 4 Yes 2 
824 Yes 3 No 3 
825 Yes 4 No 3 
826 Yes 2.5 Yes 2 
827 Yes 3 Yes 1 
828 Yes 2.5 No 1 
829 No 0.5 No 0 
835 No 2 No 0 
836 Yes 1.5 No 1 
837 Yes 2 Yes 2 
838 No 2.5 Yes 1 
854 No 2 No 1 
855 Yes 1.5 No 2 
856 No 1.5 Yes 2 
857 Yes 0.5 No 3 
859 No 1 No 0 
860 Yes 2 No 1 
861 Yes 2 Yes 2 
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55 
 
862 Yes 2.5 No 4 
863 No 1.5 No 0 
864 Yes 3.5 Yes 1 
865 Yes 1 No 2 
866 No 3 Yes 2 
 
(Table A.2 cotd) 
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APPENDIX B: PRESENTED MATERIALS 
 
Appendix B.1  Verbal Instructions 
“Welcome to Matchmaker.  You are here to help two new clients find compatible matches.  You will do 
this by seeing potential matches and testing to determine what each client’s preferences are.  Please pay 
careful attention to all on-screen instructions. 
Please make sure your cell phone and any other devices are silent or turned off during the task.  When you 
are ready to begin, press the ‘B’ key.” 
 
Appendix B.2  Client Pictures 
 
Appendix B.3 Client Descriptions 
 
Frank recently graduated from LSU with a degree in sports medicine.  He now works at a local high school. 
 
James just finished his degree in computer programming.  He's currently employed as a designer for Nintendo. 
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Appendix B.4 Match Descriptions 
 
Frank 
 Mary is an avid fan of LSU football.  She's a 26 year old with long blond hair.  She writes poetry in 
her spare time and likes going to bars. 
Susan is an LSU cheerleader.  She is 21 years old and an amateur singer.  She has short brown hair.  
She does not like to drink. 
 
Karen has season basketball tickets.  Karen is 31 and likes to paint. She is a brunette.  She has never 
consumed alcohol. 
 
Lisa is the third generation of her family to play softball at LSU and a proud supporter of the Tigers.  
She has long brown hair and is 28 years old.  She enjoys sketching when she isn't bar hopping. 
 
James 
 
Jenny considers herself a hardcore video gamer.  She's a 25 year-old brunette.  She doesn't drink but 
loves singing karaoke. 
 
Heather is an avid player of first person shooter video games.  She is a 27 year-old blond and likes to 
write in her spare time.  She enjoys drinking with her friends. 
 
Beth loves playing games on her xbox.  She has long blond hair and enjoys classical music.  She 
does not like to drink and she is 23 years 
 
Nancy really enjoys playing World of Warcraft and other online games. She has short blond hair and 
is 31 years old.  She enjoys painting in her spare time and is a wine enthusiast. 
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APPENDIX C: TEST MATERIALS 
Appendix C.1 Hypothesis Test 
For the following list, you will first rate the importance of each compatibility factor from 0 (Not Relevant at all) to 5 (Extremely Important) when 
making a match for FRANK.  After that, mark which of the options FRANK prefers for any relevant factor. 
FACTOR IMPORTANCE (0-5) BEST CHOICE FOR A MATCH 
Entertainment Preference  If ENTERTAINMENT PREFERENCE is relevant, which choice(s) does 
Frank like best? 
 Sports 
 Video Games 
 Movies 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Age  If AGE is relevant, which age range(s) does Frank like best? 
 21-24 
 25-28 
 29-32 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Drinking Habits  If DRINKING HABIT is relevant, does Frank like for the match to drink 
regularly? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Hair Color  If HAIR COLOR is relevant, which color does Frank like best? 
 Brown 
 Blond 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Artistic Hobby  If ARTISTIC HOBBY is relevant, which choice does Frank like best? 
 Drawing 
 Writing 
 Music 
 Doesn’t Matter 
 
For the following list, you will first rate the importance of each compatibility factor from 0 (Not Relevant at all) to 5 (Extremely Important) when 
making a match for JAMES.  After that, mark which of the options JAMES prefers for any relevant factor. 
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FACTOR IMPORTANCE (0-5) BEST CHOICE FOR A MATCH 
Entertainment Preference  If ENTERTAINMENT PREFERENCE is relevant, which choice(s) does 
James like best? 
 Sports 
 Video Games 
 Movies 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Age  If AGE is relevant, which age range(s) does James like best? 
 21-24 
 25-28 
 29-32 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Drinking Habits  If DRINKING HABIT is relevant, does James like for the match to drink 
regularly? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Hair Color  If HAIR COLOR is relevant, which color does James like best? 
 Brown 
 Blond 
 Doesn’t Matter 
Artistic Hobby  If ARTISTIC HOBBY is relevant, which choice does James like best? 
 Drawing 
 Writing 
 Music 
 Doesn’t Matter 
PRESS C TO CONTINUE IN THE TASK WHEN YOU ARE DONE 
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Appendix C.2 System Knowledge Test 
On this test, you will estimate the probability of a client liking a match for each choice.  For each choice, give your 
estimate (from 0% to 100%) of how likely the client is to like a match with the listed quality. 
Match Quality Frank James 
Enjoys Sports   
Enjoys Video Games   
Enjoys Movies   
Has Blond Hair   
Has Brown Hair   
Likes to Drink   
Does Not Like to Drink   
Likes to Write   
Likes to Draw   
Likes Music   
 
Describe the best possible match for each client.  Please try to print legibly. 
 
 
 
Frank 
  
 
 
James 
  
PRESS C TO CONTINUE IN THE TASK WHEN YOU ARE DONE 
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